Introduction
Moore and Pollack have recently given an analysis of R.ST relations in tel'mS of intentional versus informational levels of discourse [5] . Accol'ding to their (convincing) analysis, presentational RST relations correspond to the intentional level of discourse and subject matter relations to the inlbrmational level. For each text there shouhl exist two RST analyses: one containing only presentational relations and the other containing only subject matter relaLtions. Mann and Thoinpson had discussed multiple analyses in RST (Ill, l)P. 2(i-30), stating that a presentational analysis is the only analysis when l)oth presentational and sul)ject-matter relation definitions are satisfied between a given pair of text spans. In their view, the l)resentational analysis is chosen as correct since it describes the changes in the bearer's system of belie£s, i.e. provides deeper insights into discourse goals. Moore and Pollack, however, argue that these two a.nalyses should not compete; instead, "a complete model of discourse structure lnust maintain both levels of relation".
In this paper we take this argument one sma.ll step further and suggest a way these two levels might be organized into a stratified structure. Our discussion here ha.s a very narrow focus anti does not attempt to answer such iml)ortaut (luestions a.s whether the RST collection of presentational relations is exhaustive and adequate [br describing a.ll possible lilt(rational structures.
Analogy with "Meaning" vs. "Means" in MTT
In Meaning-Text theory (MTT), when there are two (o1' more) alternative analyses of text which (according to intution) belong to distinct levels of representation, one should ask whether one of tlmm can be seen as a means of expressing the other. Moore and Pollack argue for co-existence of intentional (presentational) and infornlatiolLa] (subject matter) allalys(,s, but they do not attempt to describe the relationship between them. They show that there is no one-to-one mapping between presentational and subject matter relations, and moreover, that the presentational and subject matter analyses may have different structures (e.g., the i)resentational and subject matter relations may have opposite directionality, [5] , pp. 542-543). Their conclusion is that there is no easy way to relate these two levels.
Froln the viewpoint of MTT, however, the intentional vs. inibrma.tiona.l dichotomy observed by Moore and Pollack appears quite natural. An a.nalogy ca.n be seen with the relationshil~ between the semantic and deep syntactic levels in MTT: semantic relations are in a many-to-many correSl)ondence with (leep syntactic relations. Moreover, there is no isomorl~hism or even preservation of structure between a semantic graph and a deep syntactic tree which expresses it. For exaxnple, on the semantic level, an adverb such as oftcn is typically analyzed a.s a predicate whose argument (i.e., dependent) is the remaining sentence graph. On the (deep) syntactic level, the same adverb is a dependent of the main verb. Thus the direction of dependency can easily change as one passes from semantics to syntax.
Following this analogy, we propose to consider the informational level of discourse as a means of expressing the intentional level. Intuitively, this seems quite l)lausil)le because inlbrming the hearer about informational relations 1)etween discourse elements can hardly be considered a self-sufficient goal. Moore and Pollack stress that the intentional level is the primary one since it describes the speaker's strategy to achieve her intentional goal.
In keeping with MTT methodology, to give substance to a claim of separate strata, one must produce a system of rules that map the relations of the "meaning" level to the relations of the "means" level. Each "meaning" relation can map to many "means" relations (or comi)inations of such relations) and vice versa, one and the same "means" relation can al~pe~.r in more than one mapping rule. Ea.ch rule describes the contextual conditions tbr its a.pl)lic;l.tion in enough detail to justify the distinction between various "means", if such exist.
At the moment, we can give only a few examl)les of such real)ping rules, olle of which we [)resent below. Nevertheless, we present this very preliminary ana.lysis ti)," l),H'l)()ses of discussion, in the belief that work in discourse rel)resentation is crucial for text generation the¢)ry and apl)lications.
A stratificational view has significant iml)licatioHs. ()lie of these is to eliminate lineal" order from the description of intentional RST relations. Note th~l.t in RST a givel, intentional relati~m may hold between two text segments a.l)pearing in either order provided th~l.t apl~tol)riate discourse connectives are used. In our view, linear order and, correspondingly, discourse connectives should appear only on the informational level. A1)stract intentional relations express only the dependellcies between propositions, not the lexical or "syntactic" artifacts associated with the means of their expression.
Example of One-to-Many Mapping
The following example, taken fi'om Moore and Pollack, shows a. one-to-many ma.pl~ing from an intentional relation to various inibrmational relations.
(la) George Bush supports big 1)usiness. (lb) He's sure to veto House Bill 1711.
IlL Moore and Pollack's analysis, (la) and (tl,) are connected I)y the illtetltional relatit,ll Evidence. In particular, satellite (la), is given as Evidence, to increase th(, heater's belief ill nucleus (lb). The hearer is assumed to believe (la) or tind it credil)le.
Moore and Pollack show that the same example a.(hnits a.n analysis on the infi)rnlational level in terms of the Volitional Cause relation. In our terms, this wouhl mean that the intentional relation Evidence can 1)e realized 1)y the informatiollal relation Volitional Cause under certain conditions. If there are other informationa.l relations that are cal)al)le of realizing the same intentional relati()n, these conditions should clearly i(lentity the apl)lication context tbr each it~fc)rmational relation.
Another informationa.l relation capal)le of realizing Evidence is Non-Volitional Cause, as
shown in text (2a-21)):
(2a) Winters in Montreal are so cold.
(2b) (Therefore,) I need a fltr coat (faux, of course).
To increase the hearer's belief in nucleus (2b), the speaker uses satellite (2a) as Evidence. On the informational level these two propositions are connected l)y a Non-Volitional Cause relation.
Another example of an informational rela.tion realizing Evidence comes fi'om Mann and Thompsoil, who admit that some texts can l)e given analyses in terms of both Evidence and Elaboration [1] . Consider a Inodification of (la-lb) above:
(3a) George Bush definitely supports big business. (31)) (Look,) He just vetoed House Bill 1711.
Here, (3a) is nucleus and (3l)) is satellite, given as Evidence to increase the hea.rer's belief in (3a). On the informational level these two propositions can I)e seen as connected ])y Elaboration, where (3l)) is a concrete instance of a more general 1)roposition (3a). In contrast, in I)oth examples 1 and 2 the satellite (la,2a) was a general proposition.
We offer the following sketch of an Intentional-to-informational ma.I)ping rule:
If the intentional relation Evidence holds between two propositions PI and P2, where P1 is a nucleus and P2 is a satellite, then, if P1 is a general proposition (i.e. the equivalent of a corrlrnoi, set,se "law" is given as Evidence), then if there is a conscious agent such that I)oth P1 and P2 ret~r to her acticJns, then the Volitional Cause informational r~la.tiozJ can 1)~ chos~ll; else (if there is no agent in PI and P2 as (lescril)e(l above), then the Noll-Volitiolml Cause iJktbrmational relation can be chosen; if P2 is a general proposition, then the Elaboration information relation can 1)e chosen.
Example of Many-to-One Mapping
Moore and Pollack also give an exa.nll)l(:' of 1.(~xt Sl~l.lls whi(:h at(' il, the Condition relation on the informational level and, del)ending oil the reading, eithel" ilk the Enablement or Motivation relation oil the intentional level.
(5a) Come home 1)y 5:00.
(5b) Then we can go to the hardware store before it closes.
First reading (Condition/Enablement): the speaker is ilLter(,sted ill increasing tile hearer's ability to perform the action described in (5h). Second reading: the speaker is just interested in motivating the hearer to do (Sa) (because, say, a surl)rise party is l)lanned).
Viewing this examl)le fi'om our 1)erspective, both intentional relatioHs, Enablement a,n(l Motivation, can 1)e realized on the informational level I)y Condition. This is quite analogous to the way in which an aml)iguons sentence may be the common syntactic realization ot" two distinct semantic structures. Also, there is no linear order (or t.he'n colDnective) on the intelltiona] level. But there is a direction of del)en(lency of satellite Oll m~cleus. Tim directiollality of the (lel)en(lency relation is preserved in the Enablement/Condition pair, and is revers~d ill the Motivation/Condition pair. As noted above, (lel~en(lency reversal is not surl)rising wh(,ll ()lke maps between distinct levels of description.
